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Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides many African countries an important source of capital 
inflow. Despite notable improvements in these capital-scarce countries' economic, political, and 
social conditions, foreign investors have not considered them viable host locations. Since FDI 
brings enormous spillovers to its host, some countries have recently institutionalized globalization 
as the catalyst for reversing the trend. Against this backdrop, we examine the FDI–globalization 
nexus across 47 African countries for the 1996–2016 period. Using the augmented mean group 
estimator, the results suggest that FDI in Africa is indeed globalization-induced. Moreover, we 
find this positive nexus to be driven by the economic dimension of globalization. Overall, we 
demonstrate the potential of globalization in stimulating an FDI boom in Africa.  
 







Globalization entails the process of creating network connections among actors at intra- or multi-
continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows, including capital, goods, ideas, and 
people (Clark, 2000). In defense of globalization, Bhagwati (2004) argues that globalization is 
instrumental in improving the quality of life. As an indispensable component of globalization, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has received considerable attention over the past three decades. 
However, Bhagwati (1978) suggests that FDI has mostly benefited highly-globalized countries 
than their lowly-globalized counterparts. 
FDI emerges as an outcome of the resource-, market-, efficiency- and strategic asset-
seeking investment activities of multinational corporations (MNCs).1 Narula and Dunning (2010) 
identify FDI as the most effective way for MNCs to enter developing countries. They argue that 
MNCs' activities in these countries stimulate domestic capital accumulation (Cipollina et al., 2012; 
Thangavelu et al., 2009; Gorg and Greenaway, 2004) and narrows the financing gap in investment 
that impedes economic growth (UNCTAD, 2013).2 While FDI flows to developing and transitional 
countries fell in 2018, developing countries still hosted a record 54% of global FDI inflows 
(UNCTAD, 2019a). 
The extant literature holds the view that FDI is primarily driven by globalization. In part, 
globalization offers MNCs better access to the international factor market (UNCTAD, 1998) and 
re-shapes the organization of MNCs' offshore activities (Cantwell and Narula, 2001). Empirically, 
                                                          
1 UNCTAD (1998) argues that globalization has changed the way MNCs pursue their investment objectives. 
2 Jude (2019) demonstrates that FDI crowds out domestic investment in the transitional countries in the short run, but 
in the long run, it crowds in domestic investment. Noting the importance of the mode of FDI entry, Chen et al. (2017) 
find that greenfield FDI crowds out domestic investment in China while cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) crowd it in. 
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Flores and Aguilera (2007) identify globalization to be the motivation behind the top-100 US 
MNCs' locational choice.  
Over the years, many African countries have attempted to attract FDI by institutionalizing 
globalization as part of the economic reform package during the post-colonial era. However, the 
amount of FDI in Africa remained abysmal relative to other regions. According to UNCTADStat 
(2019), Africa's share of the global FDI inflows stood between 0.71% and 4.83% during the 1990–
2018 period. This trend was in sharp contrast to an average of 3.92% reported before 1990. These 
observations suggest that a positive FDI–globalization nexus might be a myth in Africa. 
In this paper, we examine the possible nexus between FDI and globalization in Africa. To 
date, the extant literature (see, for example, Chinn and Ito 2006, 2008; Quinn et al., 2011) has 
mostly captured globalization in terms of trade and financial openness or capital mobility 
restrictions. However, these measures are unidimensional that neglect the social and political 
aspects of globalization. With this in mind, we capture globalization by the KOF Globalization 
Index. The index is an ideal choice because it not only encompasses the economic, political, and 
social dimensions of globalization but also provides the de facto and de jure measures of 
globalization (Gygli et al., 2019).  This multidimensional index was also used by Aluko et al. 
(2020) who demonstrate asymmetry in the Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel Granger non-causality test 
between globalization and FDI in Africa. We depart from Aluko et al. (2020) in that we apply the 
augmented mean group (AMG) estimator to ascertain the direct effect of globalization on FDI. In 
theory, this estimator is robust to endogeneity and employs an unobserved common factor to 
control for cross-sectional dependence and time-variant heterogeneity in the relationship. 
Moreover, we distinguish between the de jure and the de facto measures of globalization to 
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ascertain whether the de jure measure is only stringent on paper but ineffectual in reality, making 
de facto globalization more important (Kose et al., 2009). 
 Using the data from 47 African countries for the 1996–2016 period, we find globalization 
to be an important FDI driver in Africa. We decompose globalization into different dimensions 
and show that economic globalization exerts the most significant effect on FDI. We argue that the 
strength of the FDI–globalization nexus reflects the dominance of a particular globalization 
dimension in the host country. As such, the policymakers should reorientate their effort to 
improving economic globalization, which serves as a precondition for an FDI boom on the 
continent. Before empirically assessing the FDI–globalization nexus, we now present some 
stylized facts on the context of FDI inflows in Africa.  
2. THE CONTEXT 
From the outset, Africa is the world's second most populous continent and has an ample reserve of 
natural resources, both of which make it an attractive host location for the market- and resource-
seeking FDI (Adams & Opoku, 2017; Sakyi & Opoku, 2014). However, FDI flows to Africa 
remained significantly lower than those reported for the rest of the world. According to 
UNCTADStat (2019), Africa accounted for less than 5% of the annual global FDI inflows 
throughout the 1970–2018 period. Broadly, this relatively poor performance reflected perhaps the 
lack of a coherent FDI strategy adopted by many African governments and the perception issue 
that that might have clouded the foreign investors' locational choice.3 Despite these concerns, FDI 
always superseded other forms of foreign capital inflows into the region. Historically, the primary 
sector was the leading FDI recipient in Africa, although its dominance was under threat from the 
                                                          
3 Asiedu (2002) argues that MNCs find Africa less attractive for their investments compared to other continents 
because of its geographical location as well as their perception of Africa being a high-risk business environment partly 
caused by their narrow knowledge of African countries. 
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services sector in recent years. Based on these observations, Agbloyor (2019) argues that FDI 
represents the most important development finance for Africa.  
Africa’s highest share of global FDI inflows occurred in 2009, which might have reflected 
the limited investment opportunities in the developed world following the global financial crisis. 
Despite a decline in global FDI inflows in 2018, FDI in Africa surged from US$41 billion in 2017 
to US$46 billion in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2019a). In general, this favorable trend can be attributed to 
the boom in resource-seeking FDI, the rise of diversified FDI portfolios, and an FDI resurgence in 
South Africa (UNCTAD, 2019a). For example, in 2018, South Africa accounted for approximately 
41% of greenfield FDI projects and 88% of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the 
continent (UNCTAD, 2019a). Although intracompany cross-border transfers underpinned the FDI 
boom in South Africa, Egypt remained the leading FDI recipient in Africa (UNCTAD, 2019b). 
What makes this trend even more striking is that by 2012 Egypt had recovered from the fall of 
$0.5 billion in FDI inflows during the 2011 Arab Spring (OECD, 2020). In fact, relative political 
stability in the subsequent 2012–2016 period saw Egypt enjoying an annual average of 24% 
growth rate in FDI inflows (OECD, 2020). In a latest report by RMB (2020), it identifies a large 
market, a sophisticated business sector, and favorable policies to be the competitive advantages 
that propel Egypt as the most desirable FDI destination in Africa.  
Table 1 shows that Africa's share of the global FDI inflows remained very low relative to 
global performance for the 1990–2018 period. With an average of US$4,346 million in the 1990–
1994 period, Africa accounted for 2.18% of the global inflows. While its average inflows in the 
1995-1999 period slightly doubled from the previous period to US$8,925 million, it only 
represented 1.5% of the global inflows. In the 2000–2004 period, its share of the global inflows 
surged to an average of US$16,048 million. This upward trend continued into the 2005–2009 
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period as the average inflows grew almost threefold from its previous record to US$45,967 million. 
In the 2010–2014 period, the average inflows again increased slightly to US$50,618 million or 
3.52% of the global inflows. However, the trend was reversed in the 2015–2018 period, with the 
average inflows of US$47,662 million or 2.83% of the global FDI inflows. In short, the average 
FDI inflows consistently grew for most of the 1990–2018 period, but its share never exceeded 4% 
of the global inflows across all periods. In part, this dismal performance reflects the MNC's 
perception that investing in locations with inherently weak economic institutions and 
macroeconomic conditions is a risky proposition (Asiedu, 2002; Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006).  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows that the FDI inflows are unevenly distributed across Africa. Between the 
years 1990 and 2018, North Africa was the largest FDI recipient, followed by West Africa. These 
two regions regularly swapped places as the leading recipients during this period. For example, 
except in the 2010–2014 period, North Africa ranked as either the first or second leading recipient 
on the continent. Specifically, its share of Africa's FDI inflows fell drastically from an average of 
42.05% or US$ 19,330 million in the 2005–2009 period to an average of 25.15% or US$12,729 
million in the 2010–2014 period. Undoubtedly, this decline reflected the political turmoil of the 
Arab Spring. For East Africa, its dominant second place in the 2010–2014 period echoed the 
investment in Tanzania's gas sector and Ethiopia's textiles sector (UNCTAD, 2015). Despite the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa during the 2010–2014 period, its average FDI inflows were 
US$14,891 million, making it the leading recipient in Africa. In the subsequent 2015–2018 period, 
North Africa overtook West Africa by an average of US$ 13,391 million. Although FDI flows to 
East Africa marginally declined, it retained second place behind North Africa. The 2015 recession 
and legal disputes between the government and MNCs in Nigeria caused significant capital flights 
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(UNCTAD, 2019).4 Consequently, West Africa came third when its inflows drastically fell from 
an average of US$14,8901 million in the 2010–2014 period to US$10,916 million in the 2015–
2018 period.  
[Table 2 here] 
 We now describe our research methodology, including the model, data, and preliminary 
analyses.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. The model 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between FDI and globalization in Africa through 
Dunning’s (1978, 1979, 1998) eclectic paradigm of international production. In essence, the 
paradigm argues that FDI serves as a vehicle for a firm to combine locational advantages with its 
ownership and internalization advantages. Since locational advantages include the comparative 
and competitive advantages that a country possesses over its rivals, they are country-specific and 
must be controlled for when examining globalization as an FDI attractor. Therefore, we propose 
the following model: 
 'it i it it itFDI Globalization Z        (1) 
where itFDI  stands for FDI inflows, itGlobalization  denotes the globalization measure, 'Z  is a 
vector containing a set of host country-specific factors, and it is the error term. We are interested 
in the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on globalization,  . Specifically, a positive 
                                                          




and significant   indicates that globalization induces FDI in Africa. To control for endogeneity 
and path dependency, we extend Equation (1) by including the lagged FDI as an additional 
regressor:5  
 1 'it i it it it itFDI FDI Globalization Z        (2) 
To select the host country-specific factors captured by 'Z , we identify the robust 
determinants of MNCs' locational choice from the extant literature. For example, Du et al., 
(2008a,b) and Asiedu (2006) find that foreign investors prefer locations with strong institutional 
quality that protects private property rights in Africa. Meanwhile, Asiedu (2006) and Agbloyor 
(2019) show that investment uncertainty under macroeconomic instability deters FDI in Africa. 
As expected, Asiedu (2006) and Agbloyor (2019) find that those resource-rich African countries 
attract more resource-seeking FDI. Meanwhile, Anyanwu (2012) and Asiedu (2006) identify a 
strong positive correlation between FDI and market size in Africa. Since stronger financial 
development sends a signal to foreign investors that the domestic financial sector faces fewer 
financial market frictions (Desbordes and Wei, 2017; Yao et al., 2021), Agbloyor (2019) finds it 
to be a significant FDI attractor in Africa. Finally, Ibrahim et al. (2019) and Agbloyor (2019) show 
that infrastructural development, such as stable utility supplies and accessible transportation 
networks, stimulates FDI inflows in Africa. Following this, our control variable set includes 
institutional quality, macroeconomic instability, natural resources, market size, and infrastructure 
accessibility.   
3.2. Data 
                                                          
5 Path dependency in FDI occurs when the level of present FDI inflows increases with the amount of accumulated 
FDI stock in the host location. 
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We utilize a panel comprising of annual observations for 47 African countries over the period 
1996–2016. We are unable to extend the sample (countries and period) due to unavailability of 
data. For example, the governance indicator only became available from 1996 and onwards. 
Similarly, the most recent publication of the globalization index was in 2016. Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents a list of countries included in this study. 
In line with the extant literature, we measure FDI by the net inflows of FDI as a share of 
GDP. We obtain the series from the World Development Indicators (WDI). We capture 
globalization by the KOF Globalization Index constructed by Gygli et al. (2019). Unlike the 
traditional measures of globalization like trade openness, the KOF Index approaches globalization 
through a multidimensional lens by including international trade and capital flows, as well as cross-
border interactions between citizens and governments. As a result, the index can be further 
decomposed into economic, social, and political globalization. Specifically, the economic 
globalization index is constructed based on information from the long-distance flow of goods, 
capital, services, and information and the perception about market exchanges. Meanwhile, the 
political globalization index is developed from information that reflects the degree of government 
policy diffusion. Finally, the social globalization index is built on information that indicates the 
spread of ideas, information, images, and people. For consistency, each index is scaled between 
0–100, with a larger value representing a higher degree of globalization. Another feature of the 
KOF Index is that it reports the de facto and de jure measures of each globalization dimension. 
Whereas, the de facto measure recognizes the realized international flows and activities relating to 
trade, capital, people, and information and ideas, the de jure measure encapsulates the policies, 
resources, conditions, and institutions that influence these realized flows and activities (Gygli et 
al., 2019). For completeness, we separately examine the effect of each globalization dimension as 
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an FDI driver. We obtain the data from the KOF database administered by the Swiss Economic 
Institute (http://www.kof.ethz.ch/globalisation/).6 
In line with Kaufmann et al. (2011), we measure institutional quality by averaging the six 
governance dimensions from the World Governance Indicators (WGI).7 The estimates of the 
governance indicators occupy a range between –2.5 and 2.5. Since many studies have gauged 
macroeconomic instability by the volatility of the inflation rate, we select the annual growth rate 
of the implicit GDP deflator (Feeny et al., 2014; Gui-Diby, 2014; Wisniewski and Pathan, 2014; 
Habyarimana and Opoku, 2018). We measure the availability of natural resources as the ratio of 
natural resources rent to GDP (Asiedu, 2013; Agbloyor, 2019). We capture market size by the 
share of the urban population, on the basis that a large urban population provides a stable labor 
force supply and represents a huge virgin market for MNCs (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009). 
We represent financial development by the Svirydzenka (2016) index, which assesses the 
accessibility, depth, and efficiency of the financial system. This index is scaled between 0 and 1, 
with a larger value indicating stronger financial development. Finally, we characterize 
infrastructure accessibility by the fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people (Agbloyor, 2019; 
Ibrahim et al., 2019).    
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and data sources for the variables in the model. 
From 1996 to 2016, FDI is averaged at 4.74%. Globalization has an average of 46.81, which falls 
below the world average of 56.72, suggesting that many African countries are not well integrated 
                                                          
6 Interested readers are advised to refer to Gygli et al. (2019) for a comprehensive discussion on the KOF indexes. 
7 The six governance dimensions are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law. 
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into the global economy.8 Meanwhile, the coefficient of variation suggests little variations across 
the countries in various globalization measures considered in this study.  
[Table 3 here] 
3.3. Preliminary analyses 
Although conventional estimators typically assume stationarity during the analysis, they can 
generate spurious results if the variables are nonstationary (Greene, 2003). Since it is not 
uncommon for macroeconomic time series to exhibit nonstationarity (Hamilton, 1989), we employ 
the Pesaran (2007) cross-sectionally augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin (CIPS) panel unit root test. 
Essentially, the CIPS test is a cross-sectional augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) regression model 
with the cross-sectional means of the lagged levels and first differences of the variable. According 
to Im et al. (2003), the CADF model is given by: 









  . The CIPS test statistic is calculated as the mean of individual-country 
CADF test statistics: 





iCIPS N T N t N T

    (4) 
where  ,it N T  is the CADF for the ith cross-section unit given by the t-ratio of the coefficient of 
1ity   in Equation (4). 
Apart from testing for the panel unit root, we also test for cross-sectional dependence 
(CSD) in the error terms, which can arise from common shocks to, and unobserved idiosyncrasies 
                                                          
8 Table A1 reports that 42 countries in Africa record a mean value of the KOF overall globalization index that falls 
below the world mean value.  
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of, the cross-sectional units (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). If CSD is present in the model, standard 
panel data estimation could produce inconsistent estimates (Kapetanios et al., 2011). To address 
this concern, we select the Pesaran (2004) CSD test, which is based on the average of the pairwise 
correlation coefficients of the ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals from the cross-sectional unit 






















   (5) 
where T is the time interval, N is the number of cross-sectional units, and ˆij  is the pairwise 
correlation coefficient between cross-sectional units. 
Table 4 presents the CIPS and CSD results. The CIPS test suggests political globalization 
to be the only stationary variable in levels. Meanwhile, globalization and de jure globalization are 
only stationary when the trend component is included. The CSD test suggests that, except 
institutional quality, all variables in the model exhibit CSD. 
[Table 4 here] 
3.4. Estimation approach 
Since our model includes variables exhibiting non-stationarity and CSD, we employ the 
augmented mean group (AMG) estimator (Eberhardt & Bond, 2009; Eberhardt & Teal, 2010). 
Specifically, AMG controls for non-stationarity and accounts for the slope heterogeneity common 
in cross-country panels. It also controls for CSD by introducing the cross-sectional means of the 
unobservable factors over time into the regression.  





ˆˆS 'tage I: it it t t it t t
T
t
DcFDI X c 

        (6) 
 1ˆStage II:  垐'it i it i t A G i
i
it MdFD X NI     
         (7) 
where X is a vector of the independent variables consisting of lagged FDI, globalization, and the 
control variables, i  is the constant term, it is the error term, ˆt is the common dynamic process, 
and ˆAMG  is the AMG estimate. To carry out the AMG estimator, we begin by estimating the first-
difference ordinary least squares (OLS) model and obtain the coefficients on the year dummies, 
ˆ
t . Next, we add ˆt to the individual-country OLS regressions and compute the AMG estimates 
by averaging the coefficients on all regressions. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. The benchmark results 
In this section, we discuss the significant results of the FDI–globalization nexus in Africa.9 
Specifically, we only focus on the models that passed the Wald test, yielded zero-order integration 
in residuals, and exhibited weak CDS.10 In Table 5, each column represents a model, and a bold 
number denotes a model with significant results. In general, we find that the coefficient on 
globalization is positive and significant in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that globalization 
induces FDI inflows in Africa. Our finding challenges Bitzenis (2003) who argues that MNCs’ 
locational choice is only influenced by firm-specific motives and downplays the effect of the 
                                                          
9 We do not report and discuss the results of the control variables but are accessible from the authors upon request. 
10 Pesaran (2015) notes that, in panel model estimation, residuals that are weakly cross-sectionally dependent do not 
pose serious limitation to estimation and statistical inference. However, statistical inference may be inaccurate when 
strong cross-sectional dependence in the residuals exists. Pesaran (2015) further notes that assuming cross-sectional 
independence in residuals, in Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-based CD tests, may be quite limited for large N panels and 
it would be more appropriate to hypothesize weak cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. Thus, due to the 
application of large N panels, we test for weak cross-sectional dependence in the residuals.  
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globalization agenda on FDI. Our finding does not utterly debunk these arguments; however, we 
provide evidence to suggest that globalization encourages the internationalization of MNCs' 
activities. We argue that MNCs are likely to invest more in countries with higher flows of people, 
information and ideas, capital, and goods.  
[Table 5 here] 
Next, we examine how globalization influences FDI inflows in two subsamples; sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) sample and non-highly-globalized African countries sample.11 We are 
interested in SSA because it hosted an average of 71% of the FDI inflows over the 1970–2018 
period (UNCTADStat, 2019). In defining the highly-globalized countries, we refer to countries 
with a mean globalization index exceeding the world globalization mean value of 57.62. Columns 
(3)–(6) in Table 5 show that overall globalization exerts a positive and significant effect on FDI in 
both subsamples. This finding indicates that globalization promotes FDI inflows and echoes our 
earlier assertion for the full-sample case. Overall, our results suggest that the positive FDI–
globalization nexus in Africa is not sensitive to sample selection bias.   
4.2. Unbundling globalization: de facto versus de jure measures 
Next, we decompose globalization by the de facto and de jure measures of the KOF overall 
globalization index. Table 6 shows that the coefficients on de facto globalization are positive 
across all the samples, indicating a positive FDI–globalization nexus. However, these coefficients 
are only statistically significant at the 5-10% level when the trend component, which captures 
                                                          
11 We create the SSA sample by dropping Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia from the full sample. In terms of the 




time-variant unobservables (Eberhardt, 2012; Eberhardt et al., 2013) is excluded from the 
estimations.   
[Table 6 here] 
In a similar vein, Table 7 shows that the coefficients on de jure globalization remain 
positive and statistically significant across all estimations and subsamples.  de jure globalization 
attracts more FDI than its de facto counterpart. For example, in the overall sample, the coefficient 
on de jure globalization is 0.208 compared to 0.124 for de facto globalization. We also observe a 
similar pattern for the SSA countries (0.225 for de jure globalization compared to 0.186 for de 
facto globalization) and for the non-highly-globalized countries (0.209 for de jure globalization 
compared to 0.180 for de facto). In other words, the positive FDI–globalization nexus may reflect 
the dominance of the de jure measure. Hence, the policies, resources, conditions and institutions 
that enhance actual flows and activities of globalization matter more for FDI inflows in Africa than 
the actual flows and activities. For policymakers, our finding suggests that the direction of FDI 
inflows in Africa is heavily influenced by the perception of favorable conditions and policies on 
trade, capital, people, and information and ideas. Host countries are foreign to MNCs; thus, it is 
host countries’ de jure policies that MNCs use to form a perception of their business environment. 
Our results buttress that of Gygli et al. (2019), Quinn et al. (2011) and Aluko et al. (2021) who 
show that the effect of the de jure measure of globalization is more pronounced than the de facto 
measure. In short, the positive effect of globalization on FDI inflows is not sensitive to the de facto 
or de jure measure. 
[Table 7 here] 
4.3. Unbundling globalization: Economic, political, and social dimensions  
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Since globalization is a multidimensional concept, we separately examine the effect of economic, 
political, and social globalization in this section. Table 8 shows that economic globalization exerts 
a positive and significant impact on FDI inflows. This finding is consistent with Majocchi and 
Strange (2007), who identify trade openness and capital mobility as the key determinants of FDI 
in a country. We also find that the coefficient on political globalization is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating stronger political globalization exerts positive influence on FDI inflows. 
This catalytic role of political globalization supports Büthe and Milner (2008), who show that 
developing countries with international political engagements like international trade agreements 
record more FDI inflows than those which do not. Unlike the previous two dimensions, we find a 
negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on social globalization. The statistically 
insignificant impact of social-globalization that we find may follow from the fact that African 
countries are not well socially integrated into the world. Their cultures are not diffused into the 
world relative to some western countries and Asian countries such as China.  
In comparing the results of the various dimensions of globalization, the effect of economic 
globalization is found to be more pronounced. For example, Table 8 shows that the coefficient on 
economic globalization (0.158) is more than 1.5 times larger than the coefficient on political 
globalization (0.093). The coefficient of social globalization is however statistically insignificant. 
The results therefore imply that higher economic globalization is more important in attracting FDI 
relative to political and social globalization. Thus, the policymakers should embrace economic 
globalization by improving trade and financial openness, market exchanges, market competition 
and production, all which will not only benefit the domestic economy but also generate spillovers 
in attracting FDI inflows.  
 [Table 8 here] 
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5. CONCLUSION  
The advocates of globalization believe that increasing globalization is a necessary condition for 
attracting FDI inflows. This belief has led to many African countries embracing globalization since 
the 1990s. However, the evidence suggests that FDI inflows to the continent remained relatively 
low during this period. An attempt to understand this mismatch between belief and reality is what 
motivated our paper.  
Using the data from 47 African countries from 1996 to 2016 and the AMG estimator, we 
find a significant effect of globalization on FDI. This finding remains robust to either the SSA 
countries or the non-highly-globalized countries sample. Undoubtedly, these findings suggest that 
FDI is globalization-induced in Africa. Against this backdrop, we argue that policymakers must 
prioritize globalization on their agenda. Moreover, our findings on de jure globalization suggest 
that policymakers must create a favorable perception that they are designing policies and 
regulations to narrow the gap between the domestic market and the global economy.  
In terms of globalization dimensions, we show that economic globalization is, by far, the 
largest force shaping FDI inflows in Africa. This finding suggests that African countries should 
continue to open their borders for investment and trade. Although social globalization wields no 
effect on FDI inflows, it could be the case that its level is too low to jump start the FDI–
globalization nexus. In other words, it would be a missed opportunity for African countries not to 
pursue social globalization, and in the process, improve overall globalization. We also find that 
political globalization fosters FDI inflows, suggesting that broadening the international 
engagement profile could be a useful strategy.  
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This paper examines the effect of globalization on FDI inflows in Africa. A worthwhile 
area for future research is investigating the transmission channels through which globalization 





Data Availability Statement 
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon 
reasonable request.  
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Table 1. FDI flow to Africa (million, US dollar)  
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018 
Global 199,351 595,643 792,412 1,379,052 1,437,039 1,686,751 
Africa 4,346 8,925 16,049 45,967 50,618 47,662.12 
America 58,315 216,330 236,792 357,814 434,792 551,430 
Asia and Oceania 50,562 116,901 166,315 373,625 512,882 584,928 
Europe 86,119 253,487 373,256 601,647 438,748 502,731 
Share in global FDI (%)       
Africa 2.18 1.50 2.03 3.33 3.52 2.83 
America 29.25 36.32 29.88 25.95 30.26 32.69 
Asia and Oceania 25.36 19.63 20.99 27.09 35.69 34.68 
Europe 43.20 42.56 47.10 43.63 30.53 29.81 
Source: Author's computation with data culled from UNCTADStat (2019). 
 
Table 2. Regional distribution of FDI inflows in Africa (million, US dollar)  
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018 
Africa 4,346 8,925 16,049 45,967 50,618 47,662 
Central Africa 281 1,128 3,833 3,985 3,394 6,720 
East Africa 310 1,189 1,828 5,285 13,232 13,045 
North Africa 1,671 2,357 4,837 19,330 12,729 13,391 
Southern Africa 238 1,844 2,723 7,197 6,373 3,590 
West Africa 1,846 2,408 2,828 10,170 14,8901 10,916 
Share in Africa's FDI (%)       
Central Africa 6.46 12.63 23.88 8.67 6.70 14.10 
East Africa 7.13 13.32 11.39 11.50 26.14 27.37 
North Africa 38.45 26.41 30.14 42.05 25.15 28.10 
Southern Africa 5.48 20.66 16.97 15.66 12.59 7.53 
West Africa 42.48 26.98 17.62 22.12 29.42 22.90 


















Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Source Mean Std. dev CV Skewness Kurtosis 
FDI WDI 4.74 10.76 2.25 6.00 73.18 
Globalization SEI 46.81 9.71 0.21 0.23 2.86 
Globalization (de facto) SEI 44.92 10.55 0.24 -0.06 2.67 
Globalization (de jure) SEI 48.73 10.07 0.21 0.46 3.04 
Economic globalization SEI 45.79 12.35 0.27 0.59 3.35 
Political globalization SEI 57.65 16.64 0.29 -0.03 2.21 
Social globalization SEI 37.32 14.11 0.38 0.50 2.66 
Institutional quality WGI -0.59 0.60 -1.02 0.30 2.69 
Macroeconomic instability WDI 17.87 177.25 9.92 23.28 586.38 
Natural resources WDI 13.01 13.03 1.00 1.96 7.83 
Market size WDI 39.31 16.35 0.42 0.33 2.70 
Financial development IMF 0.15 0.10 0.67 1.92 7.09 
Infrastructure accessibility WDI 3.33 5.78 1.74 2.84 11.38 
Notes: Std. dev and CV denote standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively. IMF denotes International 
Monetary Fund, SEI stands for Swiss Economic Institute, WDI denotes World Development Indicators, and WGI is 





















Table 4. Preliminary analyses, by Pesaran (2007) CIPS test and Pesaran (2004) CD test. 


































































































Notes: *** and ** indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. The null 
hypothesis of the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test is that the series is nonstationary. The null hypothesis of the Pesaran (2004) 
CD test is that the series is free from cross-sectional dependence. Values in parenthesis are p-values of the test 



















Table 5. FDI and globalization 
 All SSA Excluding highly-
globalized countries 

























Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 47 47 43 43 42 42 
Model diagnostics       
I(0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CD test (p-value) 0.936 0.216 0.843 0.340 0.983 0.210 
Wald test (p-value) 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Values reported in 
parenthesis are standard errors. The Pesaran (2007) CIPS unit root test is employed to determine the order of 
integration, I(d), of the residuals. Meanwhile, the Pesaran (2015) CD test is used to test for weak cross-sectional 
dependence in the residuals, with the null hypothesis that the residuals are weakly cross-sectionally dependent. We 
focus on our main variables of interest and hence do not report and discuss the control variables, but the results are 
accessible from the author upon request. 
 
Table 6. FDI and de facto globalization 
 All SSA Excluding highly-
globalized countries 

























Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 47 47 43 43 42 42 
Model diagnostics       
I(0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CD test (p-value) 0.803 0.252 0.472 0.093* 0.362 0.063* 
Wald test (p-value) 0.060* 0.044** 0.004*** 0.059* 0.009*** 0.143 










Table 7. FDI and de jure globalization 
 All SSA Excluding highly-
globalized countries 

























Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 47 47 43 43 42 42 
Model diagnostics       
I(0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CD test (p-value) 0.660 0.183 0.498 0.153 0.626 0.290 
Wald test (p-value) 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 
Notes in Table 5 also apply here. 
 
Table 8. FDI and globalization dimensions 

















    









Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Model diagnostics       
I(0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CD test (p-value) 0.228 0.621 0.308 0.465 0.295 0.384 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.036** 0.353 0.068* 0.349 




Table A1. KOF overall globalization index, by mean and rank, 1996−2016. 
  KOF overall globalization index   KOF overall globalization index 
Country Region Mean Rank Country Region Mean Rank 
Algeria North Africa 52.68 13 Liberia West Africa 46.78 23 
Angola Southern Africa 41.80 34 Madagascar East Africa 42.28 32 
Benin  West Africa 44.93 27 Malawi Southern Africa 42.23 33 
Botswana Southern Africa 52.82 11 Mali West Africa 44.8 28 
Burkina Faso West Africa 43.30 31 Mauritania West Africa 43.87 30 
Burundi Central Africa 31.87 47 Mauritius East Africa 63.94 3 
Cameroon Central Africa 45.22 26 Morocco North Africa 61.55 5 
Cape Verde West Africa 46.45 24 Mozambique Southern Africa 45.48 25 
Central African Republic Central Africa 33.32 46 Namibia Southern Africa 55.15 7 
Chad Central Africa 35.95 44 Niger West Africa 38.49 39 
Comoros East Africa 33.41 45 Nigeria West Africa 53.14 10 
Congo, DR Central Africa 38.91 37 Rwanda East Africa 38.19 40 
Congo, Republic Central Africa 47.50 19 Senegal West Africa 56.10 6 
Cote d'Ivoire West Africa 49.71 16 Seychelles East Africa 54.73 8 
Egypt North Africa 63.46 4 Sierra Leone West Africa 36.75 42 
Equatorial Guinea Central Africa 40.86 35 South Africa Southern Africa 64.55 1 
Ethiopia East Africa 37.83 41 Sudan North Africa 38.53 38 
Gabon Central Africa 52.69 12 Swaziland Southern Africa 44.61 29 
Gambia West Africa 48.08 17 Tanzania East Africa 47.47 20 
Ghana West Africa 54.36 9 Togo West Africa 47.89 18 
Guinea West Africa 39.93 36 Tunisia North Africa 64.22 2 
Guinea−Bissau West Africa 36.24 43 Uganda East Africa 46.83 22 
Kenya East Africa 51.91 15 Zambia Southern Africa 52.14 14 
Lesotho Southern Africa 46.90 21     
 
 
 
